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INTRODUCTION
The phenomenon of climate change-also known as the
greenhouse effect or global warming-has been featured on the
international agenda since the 1980s. The risk of a significant
increase in global temperature during the twenty-first century, caused
by increased greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere, has led to
broad agreement among States to build a regime to control the
emissions of greenhouse gases. In addition to the natural component
of the greenhouse effect, it is the emissions of anthropogenic origin
that is held responsible for this phenomenon, notably due to the
* Laurence Boisson de Chazournes has been a professor at the Law Faculty of the
University of Geneva since 1999, and the Head of the Department of Public
International Law and International Organization between 1999 and 2009. She has
been and is a visiting professor at the University of Aix-Marseille III, the
University of Paris I (Sorbonne), the University of Paris II (Pantheon-Assas), and
the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, and has been
invited as guest lecturer in numerous universities in Europe, North America, Latin
America, Africa, and Asia. She has gained a wide-ranging reputation in academic
circles for her contribution to international law, in such fields as the law of
international organizations, international economic law and international
environmental law, while at the same time being recognized for her practical work
as Senior Counsel to the World Bank and as advisor to many international
organizations. In the field of dispute settlement she has served as chairperson of
World Trade Organization (WTO) arbitration panels on pre-shipment inspections
and as an arbitrator for the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (ICSID) and for other arbitration fora. She has acted as Counsel before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other dispute settlement fora. She is a
member of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, a member of the WTO indicative
list of governmental and non-governmental panelists, an arbitrator of the Court of
Arbitration for Sport, and a Member of the list of Arbitrators of the French
National Committee (ICC). She holds a Ph.D. in international law from the
Graduate Institute (summa cum laude), has passed the Bar exam in France, has a
625
626 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
consumption of fossil fuels such as oil, gas, and coal, but also due to
methane emissions linked to agricultural and forestry practices. Many
problems result from the significant increase in temperature that
accompanies the greenhouse effect. These could include a rise in the
sea level, the loss of ecosystems, floods, and soil infertility. The
human consequences include epidemics, food shortages, and
movements of population. The impacts will vary from State to State
but none will be spared completely of the consequences. This is a
collective challenge and its effects will be global, although it is true
that many developing countries may suffer most as they do not
always have the resources to adopt adaptation strategies.
For this global issue, a legal regime for climate protection was
conceived in the early 1990s. Although the regime has progressively
developed since its conception, it is yet to be strengthened. In order
to protect the environment, the regime uses a number of legal
strategies, which this article will analyze in turn. These legal
strategies need to be clarified and consolidated to avoid serious
consequences over the next few decades.
I. STRATEGIES FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A LEGAL REGIME ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
A. The Holistic Nature of the Regime
Since the 1980s, international conventions have negotiated a new
genre of environmental protection. The Framework Convention on
Climate Change is a convention of this type. The challenge to which
these conventions must respond is the need to manage, through a
single legal framework, a complex environmental issue in a way that
is comprehensive, is not fragmented, and takes into account the
interdependence of natural phenomena and human actions as the
origin of damage. Action must be conducted at many levels (global,
J.D. in private law from the University of Lyon III, a B.A. in sociology from the
University of Lyon II, and a Diploma in Political Science from the Institute of
Political Sciences (Lyon).
1. Article 1.2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change defines climate change as "a change of climate which is attributed directly
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere
and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable
time periods." United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 1.2,
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter Framework Convention].
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regional, national, and local), which must complement and reinforce
each other.
Geographical distance cannot be a barrier to confronting climate
change, and all States are called upon to act. The consequences of the
damage are being and will be felt at all latitudes, and the participation
of each State is necessary for anticipating and providing solutions to
the problems. The question of climate change, along with the
degradation of the ozone layer, biological diversity, and forests, are
all part of the same dynamic. These questions, which fall within the
remit of the "global environment," highlight the solidarity and
interdependence that is emerging in the international community for
the purpose of environmental conservation and protection of common
interests at the universal level.
Constructing a universal regime for environmental protection
includes a holistic approach to addressing the issues. The legal
regulation of climate change focuses not only on climate protection
generally, but also covers its related aspects. The fight against
climate change must focus its attention on the "climate system,"
which means "the totality of the atmosphere, hydrosphere, biosphere,
and geosphere and their interactions." 2
Constructing a universal regime also imposes rights and
obligations that reflect and legally protect collective interests. It is in
this way that international instruments concerning the fight against
climate change are needed for action at the universal level and must
be the keystone in the design of legal strategies. States, declaring that
they are aware that "change in the Earth's climate and its adverse
effects are a common concern of humankind,"3 attempted, through
the establishment of policy frameworks, to transcend the rivalries
between national interests. This exercise is one of finding a balance
in the name of the promotion of a collective interest that is
manifested in universal legal instruments. It indicates that the
institutional fight against climate change is the result of a
compromise around differences between national or regional
interests, and a response to criticism by those who challenge the
merits of the strategies proposed. In this political context, the law
cannot ignore these tensions and compromises that constitute the
roadmap followed by all States. The law that is applicable in this area
2. Id. art. 1.3.
3. Id. pmbl. 1.
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is of a special nature, constructed on a multi-level basis and assigning
rights and obligations, which represent a universal perspective, or at
least "universal" in that they attempt to involve all stakeholders. The
universality of the approach does not mean uniformity of the system,
however. The differentiation of rights and obligations is a driving
force behind the construction of the climate change regime.
B. A Staggered Normative Strategy to Create a Universal and
Inclusive Approach
By adopting the Framework Convention on Climate Change,
which opened for signature at the Rio Conference in June 1992 and
came into force in March 1994, the community of States expressed
their intent to fight the problem of global warming despite the
uncertainties remaining about the magnitude and scope of its
consequences.4 The negotiation of this instrument revealed the
divergence in interests between different groups of States, especially
with respect to the economic and financial courses of action. These
differences have left their mark on the content of the Framework
Convention.
In December 1997, the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change6 was a
further step towards consolidating the climate change regime. The
Kyoto Protocol required developed States to reduce total emissions
"at least [five percent] below 1990 levels in the commitment period
from 2008 to 2012. Universalism is combined with equity in the
sense of a differentiation of rights and obligations, in particular to
4. See Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change: A Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT'L L. 451, 471 (1993) (observing
the policy differences between oil-producing states who opt for a "go slow"
approach and low-lying coastal states who argue for stronger response measures).
5. See id. at 558 (explaining how the Convention's failure to include strict
targets and timetables had political and practical significance); Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes, Le Droit International au Chevet de la Lutte contre le
Rechauffement Planetaire: Elements d'un Regime [International Law at the
Bedside of the Fight against Global Warming: Elements of a Regime], in
MfLANGES EN L'HONNEUR DU PROFESSEUR H. THIERRY [ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
PROFESSOR H. THIERRY] 43-55 (1998).
6. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 28, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
7. See id. art 3.1; see also id. Annex B (providing a list of State Parties to the
Protocol from the United States and European nations).
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benefit developing countries. As such, the responsibility for
achieving this common goal should be born by developed countries
and in accordance with the principle known as "common but
differentiated responsibilit[y]."
In the context of shaping a universalist approach in the fight
against climate change, the law has a role to play, but it must do so in
conjunction with other scientific disciplines. We must understand
that the law has a diversity of functions in the fight against climate
change. Its prescriptive contours are evident, but they are of little use
in the development phase of the regime. Other functions must also be
emphasized, such as its ability to elaborate a common language and
its utility as an instrument of legitimization. The legal regime of the
fight against climate change is very recent: the law has only
penetrated this area over the last fifteen years. But the law has
nevertheless already helped to clarify and establish the terminology
used in this area, and in the process has forged a universal
language-legal and political-common to different actors in
developed and developing countries as well as those from the public
and private sectors.9 This is an evolving language that is cognizant of
the knowledge that has emerged, as well as the agreements that are
being made. The law should not hide the tensions that require trade-
offs and compromises.
Recourse to the Framework Convention reveals that this is the
case. Providing a legal framework for an initial compromise, the
content of such an agreement is flexible enough to allow all parties
involved to adhere to it even though their precise demands may
vary.10 This technique has the added value by providing the
8. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princ. 7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (Vol. 1) (Aug. 12, 1992).
9. See, e.g., infra Part I(A), for a discussion on the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change.
10. See Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, La Gestion de l'Inter& Commun a
l'Epreuve des Enjeux Economiques: Le Protocole de Kyoto sur les Changements
Climatiques [Management of the Public Interest in the Examination of Economic
Issues: The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change], 43 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL [FRENCH DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 700, 701,
703 (1997); Alexandre Kiss, Les Traites Cadres: Une Technique Juridique
Caracteristique du Droit International de l'Environnement [Framework
Conventions: A Technical Legal Feature of International Environmental Law], 39
2014] 629
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foundation for a regime that is consolidating gradually and allows the
subsequent adoption of various legal instruments, whether additional
protocols or amendments to decisions of the State Parties to the
Convention.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto
Protocol both help to achieve this function. This strategy in the fight
against climate change represents an attempt to build a new legal
regime in light of the fact that the existing law was not equipped with
the necessary means of action.
The Kyoto Protocol provides a second framework of sorts.
Negotiations that took place during the 1992 Convention helped to
consolidate the foundations of the regime and call for the making of
new commitments. Adopted in 1997, its content has subsequently
been clarified through difficult and sometimes tense negotiations."
These negotiations resulted in the adoption of a set of thirty-nine
decisions by the State Parties to the Convention, also known as the
"Marrakesh Accords" after the name of the venue of the Seventh
Conference of the Parties in 2001.12
The Kyoto Protocol entered into force on the February 16, 2005. It
should be understood and interpreted in light of the "Marrakesh
Accords," which were in the most part adopted by the Contracting
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at their first meeting held in Montreal in
December 2005.13 The decisions made here permit its application.
This meeting illustrated that adoption of the Kyoto Protocol has not
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [FRENCH DIRECTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 792, 792-97 (1993).
11. See Daniel Bodansky & Lavanya Rajamani, The Evolution and Governance
Architecture of the Climate Change Regime, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 11, 22, 25 (Detlef Sprinz & Urs Luterbacher eds., 2d
ed. forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=
2168859 (discussing the European Union's efforts to impose a ceiling on the use of
flexibility mechanisms and discussing developing countries' efforts to obtain
greater financial assistance).
12. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154. The Marrakesh Accords were named after the venue of
the Seventh Conference of the Parties in 2001. See id.
13. See generally the decisions of the First Session of the Conference of Parties
serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Nov. 2005, available at
http://unfccc.int/meetings/montreal nov 2005/session/6260/php/view/decisions.ph
p.
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been easy and that the pathway to building a regime of climate
change policy can present many obstacles.14
Beyond the development of terminology, principles of action and
behavior should be formulated and institutions should be established.
The law has permitted their elaboration and formalization. The
regime of the fight against climate change has as its foundation the
Framework Convention, the Protocol, and the many instruments
adopted at the national and regional levels that help to implement the
regime. A new instrument is needed to complete this legal structure,
which will engage reduction commitments beyond the 2012
termination of the initial commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
As the December 2009 Copenhagen Conference revealed,15 the
negotiation of such an instrument would be subject to many
uncertainties, although the sixth meeting in Cancun in December
2010 sought the achievement of a minimum consensus. 16 While the
Kyoto Protocol prescribed quantified commitments to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, the strategic interest in involving all States
in the reduction of emissions (including the United States, but also
the emerging economies, such as China, India, and Brazil (also
known as the BRICs)) warrants a greater degree of flexibility.
14. See generally Sandrine Maljean-Dubois, La Mise en Route du Protocole de
Kyoto a la Convention- Cadre des Nations Unies sur les Changements Climatiques
[Starting Up the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change], 51 ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [FRENCH
DIRECTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 433 (2005); Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, De Kyoto a La Haye, en Passant par Buenos Aires et Bonn: La
Regulation de l'Effet de Serre aux Forceps [From Kyoto to the Hague, by Way of
Buenos Aires and Bonn: The Regulation of the Greenhouse Effect with Forceps], 1
ANNUAIRE FRANCAIS DE RELATIONS INTERNATIONAL [FRENCH DIRECTORY OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS] 709 (2000).
15. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference
of the Parties, 15th Sess., Copenhagen, Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Copenhagen
Accord, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter
Copenhagen Accord]; Emmanuel Guerin & Matthieu Wemaere, The Copenhagen
Accord: What Happened? Is It a Good Deal? Who Wins and Who Loses? What Is
Next?, IDDRI IDEES POUR LE DfBAT, no. 08/09, Dec. 2009, available at http://
www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-
debat/Id_082009_guerin wemaere copenhagen%20accord.pdf.
16. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties, 16th Sess., Cancun, Mex., Nov. 29-Dec. 10, 2010, Cancun
Agreements, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011) [hereinafter
Cancun Agreements].
2014] 631
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The initial groundwork for this approach was laid in 2011 at the
seventh session of the Meeting of the Parties in Durban. Two broad
steps were agreed upon and considered as essential to avoiding the
collapse of the global response to carbon emissions.1 First, and of
greatest urgency, the European Union and Small Island Developing
States (SIDS) achieved an agreement for the extension of the Kyoto
Protocol into a second commitment period. 19 This decision provided
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action
under the Convention, a subsidiary body established under the 2007
20Bali Action Plan, with one year to reach agreement as to the
specific details of State Parties' emission limitation commitments
under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.21 At the 2012 session of the
Meeting of the Parties in Doha, the Kyoto Protocol was formally
extended for a second commitment period of eight years, from 2013
22
until 2020. However, following the withdrawal of some large States
and the continued absence of other major emitters from the
framework of binding reduction obligations, those parties which have
undertaken commitments during this second phase (mostly the
17. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 7th Sess.,
Durban, S. Aft., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012); Bodansky & Rajamani, supra
note 11.
18. See David Crossland, The World from Berlin: The Durban Climate
Agreement 'Is Almost Useless', SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (Dec. 12, 2011, 1:02 PM),
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/the-world-from-berlin-the-durban-
climate-agreement-is-almost-useless-a-803 158.html.
19. See id.
20. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties, 13th Sess., Bali, Indon., Dec. 3-14, 2007, Bali Action Plan, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008).
21. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties, 17th Sess., Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Establishment of
an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action 1, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012) [hereinafter Ad Hoc Working
Group].
22. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 8th Sess.,
Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26-Dec. 8, 2012, Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol Pursuant to
Its Article 3, Paragraph 9 (The Doha Amendment), U.N. Doc
FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013).
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European countries and Australia) contribute only fifteen percent of
global carbon dioxide emissions.23
Second, Member States decided to launch a process under the
auspices of a new subsidiary body known as the Ad Hoc Working
24Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action. This body is
charged with developing a new "protocol, another legal instrument or
an agreed outcome with legal force" 25 for adoption by both
developed and developing States with large-scale emissions. The
Durban Platform set 2015 as a deadline for defining and adopting
26
such an instrument, and 2020 as its entry into force. At the
November 2013 Meeting of the Parties in Warsaw, an agreement was
reached well in advance of the 2015 COP to be held in Paris that
countries would submit new emissions reduction contributions. The
understanding is that these contributions would be part of a single
framework linking both developed and developing countries.
Emerging economy countries insisted on the word "contributions,"
rather than commitments, so as to leave open the discussion on the
27
legal nature of the regime to be forged.
Lastly, it is interesting to note the progressive step taken in the
outcome documents of the Doha conference. There was a willingness
to address loss and damage resulting from climate change, implying
23. See Jennifer Morgan, Reflections on COP 18 in Doha: Negotiators Made
Only Incremental Progress, WORLD RESOURCES INST. (Dec. 14, 2012), http://
insights.wri.org/news/2012/12/reflections-cop-1 8-doha-negotiators-made-only-
incremental-progress.
24. Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 21, 2.
25. Id.
26. Id. 4. This was confirmed in Warsaw in 2013. See United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, 19th Sess.,
Warsaw, Pol., Nov. 11-23, 2013, Further Advancing the Durban Platform, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2014).
27. See Thomas Spencer, 2B Continued ... The Outcome of the Warsaw
Climate Conference and Implications for Paris 2015, IDDRI POLICY BRIEF, No.
15/13, Nov. 2013, http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Syntheses/PB15
13 TS warsaw%20climate%20conference.pdf; Sandrine Maljean-Dubois &
Matthieu Wemaire, La Conference sur le Climat de Varsovie: Des Resultats
Mitiges, des Perspectives Inquietantes [The Warsaw Climate Conference], in
ENVIRONNEMENT ET DEVELOPPEMENT DURABLE-REVUE MENSUELLE
LEXISNEXIS [ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-LEXIS NEXIS
MONTHLY REVIEW] 12-17 (Jan. 2014).
2014] 633
634 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the possibility of a future liability framework. 2 8 This marked an
important step toward addressing the concerns of small island
developing States that remain in danger of being overtaken by rising
tides.29
While the Kyoto Protocol has a prominent place in respect of
quantified targets for reducing emissions and international economic
strategies for achieving the objective of reducing emissions
quantifiably, one can only wonder whether the compromises to come,
despite building on the logic of the international carbon market,
appear to mostly make room for the "internal forces" at the regional,
national, and local levels to find innovative solutions and alternatives
to using fossil fuels. Further specific and binding quantifiable
commitments at the international level would undoubtedly help to
achieve the objectives, while ultimately resting on the will of each
party to implement them. National legislation should in this context
play a major role, but it will have to be implemented within a
framework of international cooperation based on equity and the
sharing of responsibilities between developed and developing
countries. The emerging economies will be called upon for a special
contribution, taking into account their share and future projection of
emissions of greenhouse gases.
We do not know the legal form of the instrument that may
ultimately supersede the Kyoto Protocol. It is possible that any such
instrument may be the death knell for the Protocol or some of its
mechanisms. Will the new instrument be an extension of the
Framework Convention? The challenge is to ensure that the reduction
commitments will be met, even if their profile evolves and differs
from the Kyoto Protocol scheme.
28. See Roger Harrabin, UN Climate Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise
Compensation, BBC (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-envir
onment-20653018.
29. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of the
Parties, 18th Sess., Doha, Qatar, Nov. 26-Dec. 8, 2012, Agreed Outcome Pursuant
to the Bali Plan, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1 (Feb. 28, 2013); Morgan,
supra note 23.
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II. THE LAW, UNCERTAINTY, AND RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH CLIMATE
CHANGE
Beyond the need to protect a collective interest, the universalist
nature of the regime is necessary because of the nature of the risks
involved in the fight against climate change. These are global and
uncertain risks, which presuppose the establishment of control
mechanisms of a universal type. The understanding and management
of these risks has served and continues to serve as a spearhead in
building and strengthening the climate change regime.
The regime in the fight against climate change has been largely
built on the notion of a risk of significant harm, if not irreversible
harm, caused by this phenomenon of climate change. The risks have
been and continue to be the catalyst of the action. The action on these
risks is concerned with scientific uncertainty. The desire to objectify
these risks has been based on a process of scientific consultation and
cooperation, focused on the goal of reaching a global scientific
consensus on the nature of those risks. The establishment of such a
progressive consensus, in particular through the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), provides some predictability to the
legal regime of international climate protection.30 It stimulates
political and legal action. But, above all, a universal approach
ensures that everyone, at one level or another, feels they are
stakeholders in building the system.
The shared desire for scientific input in the universal plan reflects a
paradigm shift in international law. As the system is permeated by
scientific knowledge, some level of uncertainty is injected into the
regime. As a consequence of this uncertainty in the law, the principle
of precaution has come to be a cornerstone of the regime.31 The
Convention requires States to "take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and
mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or
30. See Makane Moise Mbengue, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC): A Singular Model of Expertise at the International Level, in THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 97 (Yann Kerbrat &
Sandrine Maljean-Dubois eds., 2011).
31. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Precaution in International Law:
Reflection on Its Composite Nature, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 21, 34 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Riidiger Wolfrum
eds., 2007); see also Alexander Proelss, International Environmental Law and the
Challenge of Climate Change, 53 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (2010).
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irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing such measures .... "32
By means of precaution, the legal regime of climate change
requires States to take into account in their decisions any risks to
human activity. The principle of precaution, which derives its
purpose from scientific uncertainty, is different from the principle of
prevention, which is based on science, forecasting, and expertise to
guide policymakers. Over the years, however, certainty has gained
ground on uncertainty in the area of climate change, with particular
reference to emission sources and projections in this domain, and
hence precaution gradually gives way to prevention.
The evolution of scientific knowledge of the risks associated with
climate change has been facilitated by building bridges between
different scientific communities at the national, regional, and
international levels. These bridges progressively shape the
''common" scientific discourse and provide the foundation for
normative discourse. The reports of the IPCC are significant in the
evolution of knowledge in the field.33 Despite this, precaution will
continue to factor into the legal instrument to be negotiated because
many phenomena related to climate change, for example in terms of
its impact, continue to be only partially known.
III. THE CONTOURS OF EQUITY IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
A. Universality in Differentiation
The negotiations of the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, such as those surrounding the Kyoto Protocol and the
regime for the period after 2012, have been and continue to be
impeded by the conflicting interests of different groups of States,
primarily with respect to the economic and financial aspects. In the
conflict between developed and developing countries on the division
of responsibilities, there are also differences within each group of
States. From the beginning, universalism was combined with equity
in that the responsibility for meeting the common objective should
32. Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, 3.
33. IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS (Thomas F.
Stocker et al. eds., 2013); see Reports, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://www.ipcc.ch/publicationsand data/publications and data repor
ts.shtml (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
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fall only to developed countries under the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities. 34 This type of equity is reflected in the
Framework Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
- - 35 - - -In addition to commitments to reduce emissions, industrialized
countries are subject to the requirement to provide new and
additional financial resources, as well as to encourage, facilitate, and
finance the transfer of technology to developing countries. In this
context, the Global Environment Facility, set up jointly by the World
Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), is the financial
mechanism for the provision of financial resources in the form of
36
grants and concessional loans. Other financial mechanisms were
then created following the Kyoto Protocol. 37 They are each defined
by equity in the funds they provide to developing countries, as well
as in the governance systems that they seek to implement. 38 The
Green Climate Fund, which was decided upon in Copenhagen and
given commitments of support in Durban,39 constitutes a centerpiece
of efforts to increase capital flows to developing States for the
purpose of climate change adaptation and mitigation.
The shared commitments of all States include the establishment of
emission inventories of greenhouse gases and the implementation of
sector-specific policies aimed at reducing these emissions by using
34. See Kyoto Protocol, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
http://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/items/2830.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2014)
("Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current
high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years
of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations
under the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities."').
35. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, art. 3, 1. The measurement technique
used is based on a system of assigned amount units (AAUs).
36. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, The Global Environmental Facility
Galaxy: On Linkages Between Institutions, 3 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS
L. 243, 244, 252 (1999).
37. See infra Part III(B).
38. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Les Nouveaux Mecanismes de
Financement du Developpement dans le Cadre des Changements Climatiques [The
New Mechanisms for Financing Development in the Climate Change
Framework], in LE NUOVE FORME DI SOSTEGNo ALLO SVILUPPo NELLA
PROSPETTIVA DEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE [NEW WAYS OF PROMOTING
COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 167-91
(Gabriella Venturini ed., 2009).
39. See Ad Hoc Working Group, supra note 21.
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comparable methods. In addition, States should encourage the
development and dissemination of technologies to control emissions
of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, particularly in the areas
of energy, transport, industry, agriculture, forestry, and waste
management. This information should be communicated to the
Protocol bodies to facilitate the evaluation of the implementation of
the Kyoto Protocol and the possible adoption of new measures to
meet the ultimate objective of the Convention.
The new regime to be put in place has been and is the subject of
extensive negotiations. These have taken into account the evaluations
of the IPCC, including those in its fourth report.40 They call for a
radically alternative action to that which was taken during the first
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. This may include a
veritable decarbonization of the atmosphere that is incentivized with
the objective of fifty percent emissions reduction by 2050. One of the
major emitters of greenhouse gases, the United States-hitherto
absent from the Kyoto Protocol-should be part of the new regime.
However, the United States refuses binding commitments and has
been joined since 2012 by large nations such as Russia, Japan, and
Canada.41 The negotiations to be concluded in 2015 will require and
identify new legal strategies to this end to attract greater participation
in climate change mitigation.
In addition, developed countries want to deconstruct the apparent
solidarity of the group of developing countries and involve the
emerging economies (notably China, India, and Brazil) in reducing
42
emissions of greenhouse gases. A more equitable approach is called
40. See IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE (Bert
Metz et al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdfassessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4 wg
3_full report.pdf, IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (Rajendra K.
Pachauri et al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4
syr.pdf.
41. See Regan Doherty & Barbara Lewis, Doha Climate Talks Throw Lifeline to
Kyoto Protocol, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/12/08/us-climate-talks-idUSBRE8B60QU20121208.
42. See Kathryn Ann Hochstetler, The G-77, BASIC, and Global Climate
Governance: A New Era in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations, 55 REVISTA
BRASILEIRA DE POLITICA INTERNACIONAL [BRAZILIAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS] (2012) (concluding that the effectiveness of G-77
developing countries as a negotiating bloc has come to depend on the solidarity of
the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), which at
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for by developed countries given the current and projected emission
rates of the emerging economies, and in the light of the conditions of
economic competition globally. Although these countries seem to
accept that action is needed in principle, this is not the same as a
binding commitment for a numerical reduction in emissions of
greenhouse gases subject to verification by an international system.43
In addition, the commitments of these countries has been linked to
the granting of financial assistance, 44 if not for their benefit then at
least for that of other developing countries.
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities will be
without doubt reinterpreted or redefined through the new instrument.
Emerging economies, in particular those whose emissions reach a
certain threshold, should take on new responsibilities. However, this
is likely to be in a context that will allow greater flexibility at the
national level for individual States. Can such an approach meet the
ambition of a fifty percent reduction (if not eighty percent reduction)
of greenhouse gas emissions compared to pre-industrial levels?
B. Financial and Technical Assistance and the Need for a Climate
"Marshall Plan"
The role of financial and technical assistance in the field of climate
change is to provide assistance for mitigation and adaptation. If
mitigation is the objective sought by a significant reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions, this action is not sufficient to offset the
consequences of climate change. Adaptation measures are needed,
even if they do not focus on the problem of increasing emissions of
greenhouse gases. Financial assistance for mitigation aims to reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases through, for example, projects
concerning the use of renewable energy and transportation. Financial
assistance for adaptation provides funds to States to strengthen their
resilience to the adverse impacts of climate change. 45
Durban "showed themselves to be seriously divided over climate action at Durban,
especially on the question of their own action.").
43. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 5; Cancun Agreements, supra
note 16, 16.
44. See Michael Jacobs, What Is the State of International Climate Talks?,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2013, 5:33 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2012/sep/17/internattional-climate-talks-faq.
45. See ADAPTATION COMM., UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE STATE OF ADAPTATION UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
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Adaptation to climate change primarily concerns the least
developed countries. It is, as with mitigation, inseparable from the
development process. This, however, raises the question of additional
financial and technical assistance with respect to climate change for
developing countries, which must be assessed in relation to
development aid. The management of financial assistance in the field
of climate change must therefore maintain a close link with that of
development aid.
Since the early 1990s, many financial mechanisms have been
created. The Global Environment Facility was the first global
financing mechanism to cover the incremental costs of measures to
protect the global environment and in particular the fight against
global warming. Other mechanisms have been created since. These
include the "Clean Development Mechanism" established by the
Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the Adaptation Fund, the Least Developed
Countries Fund, and the Special Climate Change Fund. The last three
have been created by virtue of the decisions of the Conference of the
Parties in Marrakech in 2001. Other financial mechanisms have been
established within the World Bank, such as the Prototype Carbon
Fund, established in 1999. In July 2008, the Board of Directors of the
World Bank approved the creation of two new investment funds: the
Clean Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund.4 6 More
recently, there has been the Green Climate Fund. This will certainly
be an important mechanism in the governance of financial assistance
in the post-Kyoto period.
As a means of cooperation between developed countries and
developing countries, financial mechanisms underline the specific
responsibilities of developed countries and the needs of developing
countries. The division of responsibilities is to promote a common
interest, namely the stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions "at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system."47 This level should be achieved "within a time
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (2013), http://unfccc.int/files/
adaptation/cancun adaptation framework/adaptation committee/application/pdf/ac
2013 report low res.pdf.
46. Boisson de Chazournes, supra note 36. For a discuss of financial
mechanisms, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Technical and Financial
Assistance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 947 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).
47. Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 2.
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frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate
change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable
economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner." 48
Since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on Climate
Change in 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the legal regime of
climate change has emerged. It now seeks consolidation. Although
the vast majority of scientists recognize the impact of human
activities on global warming, the debate is now on the contours of a
plan for the post-2012 period. In this context, both in Bali in
December 2007 and afterwards, States have insisted that the
provision of financial resources and investments should be important
49
pillars of any strategy to come.
Financial assistance for adaptation to climate change is now seen
as crucial. The contribution in terms of greenhouse gas emissions of
many developing countries, aside from the emerging economies, has
been-and continues to be-rather marginal in the context of the
overall amount of emissions.50 Nevertheless, these States are highly
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. A number of financial
mechanisms were set up to assist developing countries but it is
necessary to urgently increase the level of financial aid.
The commitment of developed countries in terms of financial
assistance is without doubt the most significant outcome of the
meetings in Copenhagen and Cancun. The document adopted in 2009
specifies that:
The collective commitment by developed countries is to
provide new and additional resources, including forestry
and investments through international institutions,
approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012 with
balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation.
Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most
vulnerable developing countries, such as the least
48. Id.
49. See Bali Climate Change Conference-December 2007, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.intlmeetings/cop_13/items/4049.
php (last visited Apr. 28, 2014).
50. See CAIT 2.0 Beta, WORLD RES. INST., http://cait2.wri.org/wri/Country%/
20GHG%20Emissions?indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%2OExcluding%20
LUCF&indicator=Total%20GHG%20Emissions%20Including%20LUCF&year=2
010&chartType-geo (last visited Apr. 27, 2014).
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developed countries, small island developing States and
Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and
transparency on implementation, developed countries
commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion
dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing
countries. The funding target of USD 100 billion per year
was confirmed in Cancun in December 2010. This funding
will come from a wide variety of sources: public and
private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative
sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation
will be delivered through effective and efficient fund
arrangements, with a governance structure providing for
equal representation of developed and developing
countries.5 1
The stakes are high. Funding needs to come from public and
private sources and to integrate domestic policies and the discussion
on "international" finance governance.52 Questions of governance are
also key in the negotiations for what will link the new Green Climate
Fund with the Conference of Parties of the Convention, the Protocol,
and any instrument to come.53 The relationship between the new and
existing financial mechanism should also be addressed in order to
avoid the phenomena of competition, fragmentation, or conflicts in
the orientation of policies.
IV. LAW, ECONOMICS, AND THE FIGHT AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
A. Economic Globalization and the Fight against Climate Change
The influence of economic globalization is prominent in the regime
of the fight against climate change, particularly in assessing efforts
and strategies to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. The economy
has become the predominant prism of action. A very important place
is given to economic strategies aimed at comparative advantage, for
51. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 8.
52. Spencer, supra note 27.
53. Lorrae van Kerkhoff et al., Designing the Green Climate Fund: How to
Spend $100 Billion Sensibly, ENV'T, May-June 2011, http://www.environmentmag
azine.org/Archives/Back%/o20Issues/2011 May-June%20201 1/green-climate-fund-
full.html.
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example, with the exchange of emission credits through investment
projects, the creation of markets for emission trading in greenhouse
gas emissions, and the imposition of taxes. These mechanisms,
following the logic of the market economy, may constitute incentives
for States and the private sector. They are designed around a dual
purpose: first, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and second,
generating revenue that can be reinvested in research and
technologies used to deal with the effects of climate change.54 In this
context, the private sector is seen as a key player in the international
instruments for combating climate change. It is specifically targeted
in the Kyoto Protocol,55 which indicates that public action is not
sufficient to deal with climate change. The policy dialogue must be
rooted in the economic life of societies.
There are problems, however, and these should be mentioned.
Indeed, the mechanisms are very technical and this can tend to
obscure the real purpose, which is to achieve the collective interest in
protecting the environment. The rationale for the establishment of
market mechanisms, including the promotion of sustainable
development for all countries should not be forgotten. The role that
civil society can take to ensure that this double purpose is not
sacrificed on the altar of compromise becomes critical in this respect.
Access to information and the principle of public participation can
support this role.
The fragmentation of law must also be mentioned. There is a risk
that the economic standards employed may come into conflict with
other standards and objectives in the fight against global warming,
such as those related to equity and human needs. The use of
economic and financial mechanisms have meaning only if they fit
within the general framework of the continued struggle against
climate change, ecological considerations, and human security, and
are interpreted with these considerations in mind. This symbiosis
between considerations of a diverse nature reveals one prerequisite of
the fight against climate change that must be respected.
Another characteristic of globalization relates to the impact of
trade rules in climate change, whether due to economic activities that
increase greenhouse gas emissions, or alternatively due to measures
54. See FORESTRY DEPT., U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., WORKING PAPER FP/12,
PLANTATIONS AND GREENHOUSE GAS MITIGATION: A SHORT REVIEW 5-7 (D.J.
Mead ed., 2001), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/006/acl32e/acl32eOO.pdf.
55. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, arts. 6, 12.
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taken with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions or, in the
further alternative, due to measures aimed at sanctioning State
behaviour that fails to meet expectation. 56 It is well known that the
possibility for conflict between the World Trade Organization
57(WTO) regime and that of climate change is high, and may occur
through unilateral measures adopted by a State under the guise of a
tax or a restriction on imports. Some of these measures can be
justified under WTO law but, if they cannot be, emerging countries
and developing countries may find that measures, such as carbon
taxes, become a source of controversy. The question is how to thwart
the possibility of recourse to unilateral measures as States prepare to
negotiate an instrument to succeed, prolong, and deepen efforts
following the Kyoto Protocol. If the community of States manages to
adopt a binding instrument, it would have to include provisions
dealing with its relationship to the WTO agreements. The Framework
Convention on Climate Change has already called for this.5 8 Any
future instrument should address the question of the relationship
between the regime of the fight against climate change and that of
international trade law, but will it address the question with sufficient
precision? 59 The principle of mutual supportiveness advocated by
other international agreements to protect the environment may be of
utility, but cannot by itself provide answers to all problems that may
arise.60 It requires that all affected actors and institutions adjust and
change their policies in a way that is sensitive to other regimes.
56. Steve Charnovitz, Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies, in
BEYOND KYOTo: ADVANCING THE INTERNATIONAL EFFORT AGAINST CLIMATE
CHANGE 141 (2003), available at http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/
PDFPapers/BeyondKyoto.pdf.
57. See Harro Van Asselt et al., Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation
ofInternational Law, 30 L. & POL'Y 423, 433 (2008).
58. See Framework Convention, supra note 1, art. 4, 5; Laurence Boisson de
Chazournes, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: On
the Road towards Sustainable Development, in ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL
STANDARDS: ECONOMIC MECHANISMS AS VIABLE MEANS? 285, 292 (Riidiger
Wolfrum ed., 1996).
59. See Copenhagen Curtain Raiser: The Perfect Storm, ICTSD BRIDGES
COPENHAGEN UPDATE 1-2, Dec. 7, 2009, http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/12/
bridges-copenhagen-update-1.pdf.
60. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Makane Moise Mbengue, A 'Footnote
as a Principle': Mutual Supportiveness and Its Relevance in an Era of
Fragmentation, in 2 COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY 1615 (Holger
P. Hestermeyer et al. eds., 2011).
[VOL. XXV
THE CLIMATE CHANGE REGIME
B. Regionalization and Universal Action
Universal action and the search for equity among members of the
international community should not obscure the diversity of
approaches, and this has been strongly emphasised in the negotiations
of the legal regime for the current second commitment period of the
Kyoto Protocol. Regional action can facilitate differentiated action.
European action shows one way towards a regionalization of action
in the field of climate change. In Doha, the European Union
committed to a twenty percent reduction in emissions by 2020, as
well as by thirty percent if other States commit to that order and if the
emerging economies show their determination to reduce their
emissions. 6 1 As such, the European Union plans to review by 2014
the ambition of all countries participating in the second commitment
period of the Kyoto Protocol.62
The actions envisaged in the European Union speak both to the
public authorities and the private sector. This regional perspective is
conscious of any universal system to come, both in the possible
expansion of the trading of emission credits or in the establishment of
an emission permits system. Other regional strategies could be
experimented with, such as reducing energy intensity by economic
sector as proposed under the initiative of the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC). These regional strategies may reflect certain
regional characteristics more precisely, such as climate data and
- - 63economic or social structures.
The Kyoto Protocol had in fact given way to the possibility of
regional measures through joint action in reducing emissions.64 Such
joint actions may be accompanied, in addition, by a differentiated
status for States that are parties. The "European Bubble"
61. See 26 November-08 December 2012 Doha Climate Change Conference
(COP 18/CMP 8), EUR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/events/0062/index-en.
htm (last updated Dec. 10, 2012).
62. Id.
63. Philippe Le Prestre, Geopolitique Regionale du Climat et Cooperation
Internationale [Regional Geopolitics of International Climate Cooperation], in
CAHIERS DE DROIT, SCIENCE ET TECHNOLOGIE [LAW, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
PAPERS] 85 (2009).
64. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 6, art. 4.
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implemented on the basis of Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol is
illustrative of this approach.65
Over the last two decades, the law has helped to build and solidify
a framework for universal action in the field of climate change. Now
it must help to ensure that the strategy outlined is put into everyday
practice, and as such that the objectives and commitments made at
the universal level now define the action of each State Party to the
Protocol. Various strategies are advocated to meet this goal, whether
economic or regional. The interplay between them should allow the
collective interest in the field of climate change as a "concern for
humanity as a whole"66 to be promoted, while ensuring that these
approaches are not at the expense of equity.
V. THE SYSTEM OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND STRATEGIES TO PROMOTE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW OR TO SANCTION NON-COMPLIANCE
The promotion of respect for the rule of law has been accompanied
by a greater focus on dispute resolution in recent years. Judicial and
other mechanisms have been created for the purpose of dispute
resolution. These often operate in the framework of multilateral
environmental agreements (MEAs).67 The latter, referred to as
procedures for non-compliance, are often described as non-
contentious proceedings to highlight their diplomatic character.
However, this qualification is in some cases too simple an analysis of
the dynamics of the procedures for non-compliance. These
procedures reveal more and more of a complex picture. There would
appear to be both diplomatic and judicial elements at play within
65. The European Community and its Member States have jointly committed to
reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases. See Council Decision 2002/358/CE,
2002 O.J. (L 130/1) 1; ANNE-SOPHIE TABAU, LA MISE EN CEUVRE DU PROTOCOLE
DE KYOTO EN EUROPE [IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL IN EUROPE]
513 (2011).
66. See Framework Convention, supra note 1, pmbl.
67. LAURENCE BoIsSON DE CHAZOURNES, LA MISE EN CEUVRE DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL DANS LE DOMAINE DE LA PROTECTION DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT:
ENJEUX ET DfFIS [IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE FIELD OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES], in REVUE GfNfRALE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [GENERAL REVIEW OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW] 37 (1995).
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them.68 Some procedures for non-compliance therefore have more of
a diplomatic character and others have more of a litigious character.
The procedure for non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is a case
in point. Drawing inspiration from other procedures for non-
compliance, it may be qualitatively distinguished from other methods
- 69of implementing international law.
This is because the Kyoto Protocol innovated an original and
complex international regime. 70 Issues of non-compliance have been
addressed since the beginning of the negotiations given the broad
scope of the commitments made by States. States had, however,
failed to reach an agreement on the appropriate mechanisms and
procedures for monitoring compliance with the Protocol at the time
of its adoption. Some consensus was achieved by the time of the
Marrakech negotiation in 2001. Procedures and mechanisms relating
to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol were first adopted by the
Seventh Conference of the Parties in Marrakech (COP 7) in 2001,
and these were then approved and adopted in 2005 by the First
Conference of the Parties (COP/MOP 1) of the Kyoto Protocol in
Decision 27/CMP.1. The originality and complexity that characterize
the regime of the Protocol are reflected in these procedures and
mechanisms. While drawing inspiration from other procedures in the
field of environmental protection, these have some particular traits.
The qualitative difference with these compliance procedures gives
72them juridical texture, ensuring effectiveness, sustainability, and
efficiency of the legal regime under the Protocol.
68. See NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES AND MECHANISMS AND THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS, ASSER INST.
(Tullio Treves et al. eds., 2009).
69. JULIETTE VOINOV-KOHLER, LE MfCANISME DE CONTROLE DU RESPECT DU
PROTOCOLE DE KYOTO SUR LES CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES [THE COMPLIANCE
MECHANISM OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ON CLIMATE CHANGE] 219 (2006).
70. Jutta Brunnee, A Fine Balance: Facilitation and Enforcement in the Design
of a Compliance Regime for the Kyoto Protocol, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 223, 226-27
(2000).
71. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference of
the Parties, 7th Sess., Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Annex,
Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002).
72. Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Makane Moise Mbengue, A Propos du
Caractere Juridictionnel de la Procedure de Non-Respect du Protocole de Kyoto
[On the Jurisdictional Character of the Kyoto Protocol Non-Compliance
Procedure], in CHANGEMENTS CLIMATIQUES-LES ENJEUX DU CONTROLE
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The Compliance Committee with the Protocol functions under two
branches, namely the facilitative and enforcement branch. The
facilitative branch is responsible for giving advice, providing
assistance to State Parties for the implementation of the Protocol and
promoting compliance with their commitments under the Protocol,
taking into consideration the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and the capability of State Parties. The facilitative
branch appears at first as a diplomatic body responsible for
promoting the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.73
The enforcement branch is responsible for determining, inter alia,
whether or not State Parties respect their quantified emission
restrictions in accordance with Article 3 of the Protocol, and whether
they comply with the reporting provisions in Article 5 and Article 7
of the Protocol and the criteria relating to economic activities set out
in Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Protocol. 7 4
The proceedings before the enforcement branch have a clear
juridical texture. The procedure is initiated by a communication
through the Secretariat, from a Party to the Protocol which has raised
questions concerning implementation by another Party to the
Protocol, either by virtue of its own judgment or on the basis of a
report of experts pursuant to Article 8. The dispute then occurs
between the Committee and the Party whose implementation has
been questioned.75 It is noteworthy that the procedure for non-
compliance with the Kyoto Protocol, as well as other mechanisms for
monitoring compliance with MEAs, entail a sui generis category of
disputes. The disputes are, in some sense, "nipped in the bud."76
Furthermore, Sections XIV ("Consequences Applied by the
Facilitative Branch") and XV ("Consequences Applied by the
Enforcement Branch") of the Decision 27/CMP. 1 confer the power to
impose sanctions to both the facilitative and enforcement branches.
INTERNATIONAL [CLIMATE CHANGE-THE CHALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL
MONITORING] 73 (Sandrine Maljean-Dubois ed., 2007).
73. See Introduction, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/kyotoprotocol/compliance/items/3024.php (last visited Apr. 24,
2014).
7 4. Id.
7 5. Id.
76. Lucius Caflisch, Cent Ans de Reglement Pacifique des Differends
Interetatiques [One Hundred Years ofPeaceful Dispute Settlement between States],
288 HAGUE ACAD. COLLECTED COURSES 447, 447 (2001).
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Thereby, a host of "consecutive measures" is provided to allow the
violating States to come back into compliance. For example, where
the enforcement branch has determined that a Party has failed to
comply with the provisions of paragraph 1 or 2 of Article 5 or
paragraph 1 or 4 of Article 7 of the Protocol, it applies "the following
consequences: (a) declaration of non-compliance; and (b)
development of a plan . . . ."" The latter requires the defaulting Party
to submit a plan to the enforcement branch, which includes "(a) [a]n
analysis of the causes of non-compliance of the Party; (b) [m]easures
that the Party intends to implement in order to remedy the non-
compliance; and (c) [a] timetable for implementing such measures
within a time frame not exceeding twelve months which enables the
assessment of progress in the implementation." 8 The plan must be
submitted within three months of the determination of non-
compliance. In addition, the defaulting Party is required to
"regularly" report to the Board on the progress of the plan. Apart
from the obligation to submit a plan, other measures may consist of
sanctions for non-compliance. This applies to the suspension of
eligibility as foreseen in Articles 6, 12, and 17 of the Protocol.
Certain consequential measures can be taken by the facilitative
branch but these are of a different nature due to its mandate, namely
to assist and advise a defaulting Party. These consist of incentives
and recommendations:
(a) Provision of advice and facilitation of assistance to
individual Parties regarding the implementation of the
Protocol; (b) Facilitation of financial and technical
assistance to any Party concerned, including technology
transfer and capacity building from sources other than
those established under the Convention and the Protocol for
the developing countries; (c) Facilitation of financial and
technical assistance, including technology transfer and
77. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Conference
of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, 1st Sess.,
Montreal, Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Procedures and Mechanisms Relating to
Compliance under the Kyoto Protocol, § XV, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3 (Mar. 30, 2006)
78. Id. § XV, 2(a)-(c).
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capacity building . . . ; and (d) Formulation of
recommendations to the Party concerned . ...
In almost all mechanisms for monitoring compliance with MEAs,
it can be difficult to distinguish between the phases of facilitation and
enforcement and, in this way, all steps in the procedure have
usually been qualified as having a diplomatic character. Given the
need to make the enforcement branch autonomous, meaningful
commitments were considered necessary to establish its legitimacy,
effectiveness, and the efficiency of the control of the implementation
of the Kyoto Protocol's provisions. Juridical guarantees better serve
these overall objectives. Indeed, the legitimacy of the procedure is
achieved mainly because of the involvement of a third party, respect
for the adversarial process, and submission to international law. The
effectiveness of the process depends on the enforceability of
- - 81decisions.
The procedure for non-compliance with the Kyoto Protocol is
atypical in that it actively promotes compliance. It controls and
sanctions non-compliance with its own provisions. However, a
procedural approach based on reporting and the establishment of a
verification system without any provision for a system to address
non-compliance has been advocated for future adoption. 82 The
question is whether the protection of a significant collective interest,
such as the drastic decrease of emissions of greenhouse gases, may
be achieved through a departure from a veritable multilateral legal
strategy that is responsive to breaches of the law. The promotion of
respect for the law by a third body is the key to the credibility and
viability of such a regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
During the development of an instrument for the post-2012 period,
doubts have been increasingly expressed about the sustainability of
the Kyoto Protocol as such. This instrument establishes a system that
engages only developed States in terms of emissions reductions and
the provision of financial and technical assistance. It seems to be
79. Id. § XIV.
80. VoINov-KOHLER, supra note 69, at 98-110.
81. Boisson de Chazournes & Mbengue, supra note 72, at 108-09.
82. See Copenhagen Accord, supra note 15, 4, 5.
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accepted that the future of the climate change regime will have to be
different, with the emerging economies taking on new
responsibilities for emission control. In addition, the Kyoto Protocol
has allowed for a complex system of international mechanisms. It
seems increasingly that in the new phase of climate change regulation
that is taking shape, an approach that endorses the "nationalization"
of actions, while disposing of some of the constraints of international
action, will be privileged.
The implementation of the Kyoto regime was necessary to
consolidate the common interest in the fight against climate change
and to cement the principles of action. Scientific knowledge and the
requirements to act are always evolving. These are testing the
political trust between States. In this context, will States be able to
act in the required way while trusting others within a legal
framework that remains largely to be defined in terms of future
commitments?
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